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In industrialized nations, sibship size generally depresses educational attainment: the larger the 
number of siblings, the lower the educational attainment. This association is much less consistent 
in developing nations, however. This article examines the effect that the number of siblings has 
on educational attainment in China, a nation that has experienced sharp vacillations between 
policies designed to promote equality (between urban and rural residents and between men and 
women) and policies designed to promote economic development. The implementation of these 
policies in the educational arena has alternately reduced and increased competition for 
educational resources and, as we show, has correspondingly reduced and increased the effect of 














































Studies conducted in the United States and Western industrialized societies show a clear negative 
effect of sibship size on children’s educational attainment, even when controlling for family 
socioeconomic background (Blake 1981, 1989; Blau and Duncan 1967; Downey 1995; 
Featherman and Hauser 1978; Mare and Chen 1986). Each additional sibling reduces schooling 
by as much as one-fifth of a year (Featherman and Hauser 1978; Mare and Chen 1986). This is a 
strong effect, exceeding that of many other family origin variables (Blake 1989). 
 
 
The inverse relationship between sibship size and educational attainment often is explained by a 
“resource-dilution” hypothesis, which posits that finite parental resources are distributed among 
siblings and each additional sibling thus reduces the family resources available to each child 
(Anastasi 1956; Blake 1981; Downey 1995). Increasingly, however, evidence shows that the 
negative effect from the number of siblings is neither universal nor inevitable, particularly in 
developing countries. Rather, it is contingent on demographic, socioeconomic, and political 
factors external to the family that influence both the availability of resources and their internal 
allocation within a family. 
 
China provides a particularly interesting case, as the past 60 years have seen remarkable social, 
economic, and political changes. China has experienced dramatic socioeconomic development, 
especially since 1978; state educational policies have vacillated between an emphasis on 
educational equality and an emphasis on expertise; and, beginning in the 1970s, there has been a 
concerted state intervention with respect to fertility control. All these changes may influence how 
the number of siblings affects educational attainment, for reasons discussed in greater detail 
below. Moreover, gender and place, two important aspects of stratification in China, may interact 
with sibship size in influencing educational outcomes as a result of persistent son preference and 
rural–urban disparities. 
 
Using data from the study Life Histories and Social Change in Contemporary China, a national 
probability sample of Chinese adults surveyed in 1996, we investigate the association between 
sibship size and educational attainment in China over four historical periods characterized by 
differing socioeconomic conditions and educational and other state policies. We also study the 
mediating effect of gender and place on this association. 
 
SIBSHIP SIZE AND EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 
 
The effect of sibship size on educational attainment has been studied for the past two decades. 
Initially, a no-effect hypothesis prevailed. The seeming effect from the number of siblings was 
thought to be a spurious artifact of extraneous factors, particularly the fact that 
socioeconomically disadvantaged families tend to have more children. Studies conducted in the 
United States and other Western societies, however, demonstrate a clear negative effect of 
sibship size on children’s educational attainment (school enrollment, standardized test 
performance, and completed education) net of family socioeconomic status (Powell, Werum, and 
Steelman 2004; Steelman et al. 2002). 









The prevailing explanation for the sibset size effect is the “resource-dilution” hypothesis 
(Anastasi 1956; Blake 1981; Downey 1995). Resources include nonmaterial assets such as 
parental time, attention, and emotional support, as well as material assets such as financial 
investments in children’s education and study environments. As sibship size increases, these 
resources are distributed more thinly over each child. In a study that explicitly tested the 
resource-dilution theory, Downey (1995) found strong support for the hypothesis that parental 
resources account for the inverse relationship between sibship size and educational outcomes. He 
also found that material resources decreased more rapidly with sibship size than did nonmaterial 
resources. 
 
Many studies in psychology have established links between sibship size and children’s cognitive 
development, even when controlling for the effects of maternal IQ and family socioeconomic 
status (Anastasi 1956; Belmont and Marolla 1973; Breland 1974; Gottfried and Gottfried 1984; 
Nisbet and Entwistle 1967). Marjoribanks, Walberg, and Bargen (1975) theorized that a child’s 
intellectual ability depends crucially on the amount of nonmaterial resources available, such as 
parental attention (see also Bakeman and Brown 1980; Clarke-Stewart 1988). The amount of 
parental attention available to a given child depends, though, on the number of children in the 
family. Children with more siblings are penalized due to the limited attention they receive in 
terms of the quantity, and possibly the quality, of parent–child interactions, which results in a 
slower rate of early development. 
 
THE EFFECT OF SIBSHIP SIZE IN DEVELOPING NATIONS  
 
As noted, a negative effect of sibship size has been widely observed in Western societies (albeit 
with diminishing force in recent periods [Downey 1995; Powell et al. 2004]), and sibship size 
has become a standard variable in studies of educational attainment. Emerging evidence, 
however, especially in the developing world, indicates that the negative association is not 
universal and often varies across contexts and population subgroups (Gomes 1984; Lloyd 1994; 
Lu 2005; Maralani 2004; Shavit and Pierce 1991). This suggests the need to study conditions and 
institutions external to the family that influence within-family resource availability and 
distribution (Buchmann and Hannum 2001). Although a number of factors mediate the effect of 
sibship size, we focus on those we can study: policy interventions and differentials by gender and 
place. 
 
The extent to which sibship size matters at the micro level may depend on specific public policy 
contexts at the macro level (see Powell et al. 2004 for a good review). For example, government 
subsidies may reduce the direct costs of schooling, thus weakening the importance of material 
resources and the negative effect of sibship size on education (Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman 
1989; Park 2005; Pong 1997; Post and Pong 1998; Sudha 1997; Xu 2003). Behrman and 
colleagues (1989) found a negative relationship between sibship size and years of schooling in 
the United States, except in special situations that equalized access to financial resources to pay 
for education, such as the G.I. Bill and loan programs operating in the late 1980s. Similarly, Post 
and Pong (1998) found a diminishing sibship size effect on school attainment in Hong Kong 
during the late 1970s, corresponding to a major expansion in free schooling. Such benefits, 
though, may be differentially available to different population subsectors. For example, in 









neutralizes the detrimental impact of sibship size on school enrollment among Malays. In 
contrast, a clear negative relationship is observed among Chinese and Indians, for whom state 
subsidies are scarce (Pong 1997; Sudha 1997). In summary, if a state subsidizes children’s 
education, parental resources matter less, as does sibship size. 
 
Gender and place may also mediate the effect of sibship size. In societies with strong son-
preference norms, such as China and most other East Asian countries, parents may choose to 
invest in the education of sons rather than daughters when their resources are inadequate to do 
both (Parish and Willis 1993). The effect of sibship size on the education of females should thus 
be stronger than the effect for males, at least when parental resources are stretched thin (Lloyd 
1994; Sudha 1997). A recent study in Taiwan lends support to this claim by showing a stronger 
sibship size effect for girls (Chu, Xie, and Yu 2007). A similar argument would lead us to expect 
a greater impact of sibship size on educational attainment in rural areas, at least in nations like 
China, where rural families are poorer and educational subsidies are more limited than in urban 
areas. 
 
EDUCATIONAL POLICIES AND EDUCATIONAL STRATIFICATION IN 
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 
 
Since 1949, the Chinese government has pursued the twin goals of economic development and 
social equality. Given the limited resources of the new government, however, these two goals 
were substantially incompatible (Hannum and Xie 1994). Although China experienced strong 
educational expansion throughout the twentieth century, both before and after the communist 
government took power (Deng and Treiman 1997), since the beginning of the communist era 
there has been great tension between the two goals. The result has been periodic shifts in 
educational policy between an ideological socialist egalitarian agenda and a practical competitive 
agenda1 (Hannum 1999; Hannum and Xie 1994; Tsang 2000). The socialist egalitarian agenda 
emphasized equal opportunities (mass education) and socialist ideals (“redness”) under a 
uniform curriculum designed to promote social equality and reduce status differences. As shown 
by numerous studies, specifically Hannum and Xie (1994), such policies dominated before 1978 
and reached their apex during the 1966 to 1976 Cultural Revolution. In contrast, the practical 
competitive agenda focused on education for economic efficiency (expertise) and emphasized 
personal advancement as a device for producing experts who could promote economic 
development. An important goal of this strategy was to maximize economic returns on 
governmental investments in education. This agenda was ascendant during Liu Shaoqi’s 
dominance in the early 1960s and, most importantly, during the post-Mao economic reform era 
that began in 1978.  
 
In China, whether one lives in an urban or a rural area is crucial in determining one’s economic 
and educational opportunities (Knight and Shi 1996; Wu and Treiman 2004, 2007). The rural–
urban gap in educational attainment results from differences in the levels of public funding and 
the quality and availability of schools, differences in rural and urban families’ ability to pay for 
schooling, and differences in the level of cultural capital possessed by each group (Treiman 
2007). The Chinese state currently regards such disparities as a serious problem because of their 
negative implications for social equality. This urban–rural gap remained very large as of 1996. 









survey and hence have no effect on the analysis. The egalitarian agenda placed great importance 
on eliminating the rural–urban gap, whereas the competitive agenda tended to favor the more 
developed urban areas (Hannum 1999).  
 
Despite efforts by the government to raise women’s status, there is still a persistent son 
preference in China (Bauer et al. 1992; Hannum and Xie 1994). Decisions about schooling 
reflect parents’ perceptions of gender roles and their understanding of gender differences in labor 
market returns on education investments. Traditional Chinese marriage and kinship patterns are 
strongly patrilocal and patrilineal, with married women expected to care for their husbands’ 
parents rather than their own. Parents therefore anticipate much greater old-age support from 
their sons than from their daughters, which means they have a much stronger incentive to 
educate their sons (Lavely et al. 1990). Such practices are still prevalent in rural China today, 
and the attendant norms persist even in the urban population (Yan 2003). 
 
A second incentive comes from men’s greater earning power relative to women and men’s 
greater access to jobs requiring educational credentials (Summerfield 1994). Men’s greater 
earning power, more or less universal across societies (Roos and Gatta 1999; Treiman and Roos 
1983), means that it usually is more rational to maximize a son’s earning power. 
 
Similar to changing rural–urban differentials, gender differences in educational attainment reflect 
the vacillation of educational policies between egalitarianism and competitive growth. Periods 
with a strong emphasis on equality are characterized by decreased gender inequality in 
education, whereas periods focusing on economic development are characterized by increased 
gender inequality (Hannum and Xie 1994). 
 
The vacillation of educational policies can be reasonably well captured by distinguishing four 
periods in recent Chinese history. We posit sharply different educational stratification regimes, 
specifically differences in the effect of sibship size on educational attainment, across the four 
periods. Although finer distinctions would be preferable, our sample size is not large enough to 
sustain analysis of more than four periods.  
 
PERIOD 1: PRECOMMUNIST ERA (BEFORE 1950) 
 
Before the 1949 transition to communism, China’s economy suffered from nearly two decades of 
war (the Anti-Japanese War and the Civil War). The economy collapsed and the level of 
socioeconomic development was extremely low. The formal educational system, never very 
extensive, was badly disrupted, resulting in extremely limited educational opportunities. 
Government policies put little emphasis on either elite or mass education. As a result, over 80 
percent of the urban population and nearly 95 percent of the rural population were functionally 
illiterate (Ministry of Education 1981).  
 
PERIOD 2: THE EARLY YEARS AFTER THE TRANSITION TO COMMUNISM (1950 TO 1965)  
 
China has undergone numerous changes since the establishment of the communist regime. The 
period from 1950 (when the new government firmly established control) to 1958 was a time of 









(Zhou, Moen, and Tuma 1998). Because of the increasing demand for skilled labor needed for 
national economic development, educational opportunities expanded. The educational policies 
during this period emphasized both economic development and social equality (Hannum and Xie 
1994). Besides building a national education system, efforts focused on the early years of 
schooling, with an emphasis on establishing universal primary education and reducing illiteracy 
(Tsang 2000). However, with scarce societal resources and an emphasis on economic 
development, education did not in fact expand to a degree that significantly reduced inequality.  
 
In response to Mao’s idea of accelerating the movement toward true communism, the Great Leap 
Forward period from 1958 to 1960 promoted educational equality through a substantial 
expansion of access to education, especially for peasant and working-class children (Tsang 
2000). At the same time, the attempt to promote rapid economic development failed, which led 
to an economic collapse and a nationwide Great Famine (Hannum and Xie 1994). As a result, 
although education became more available, many parents kept their children out of school to 
assist with economic support and to reduce family expenses. This was especially true of rural 
families, who suffered the brunt of the economic collapse, and also for girls because traditional 
son preferences made girls more vulnerable to economic hardship of any kind (Hannum and Xie 
1994). In short, during the Great Leap Forward and its aftermath, educational policies promoting 
equality were greatly undermined by the economic collapse and the Great Famine.  
 
After three years of sharp economic decline (1958 to 1960), Liu and Deng took control of 
national affairs in 1961 and, among other things, revamped educational policies (Tsang 2000). 
They believed that the limited resources should be spent where they would be most effective. To 
produce the technically-trained personnel needed for economic development, Liu and Deng 
introduced a competitive educational agenda and abruptly reversed the previous egalitarian 
policy, building on the high-quality urban school systems (academic elite schools), from which 
they could expect faster economic returns, and closing low-quality schools, especially in rural 
areas (Hannum 1999). Overall, despite expansion of the educational system relative to the pre-
communist period, educational inequalities remained strong from 1950 to 1965. This was 
especially true for rural residents and girls due to great economic constraints and the competitive 
educational agenda implemented for part of this period.2 
 
PERIOD 3: CULTURAL REVOLUTION (1966 TO 1976)  
 
Dissatisfied with Liu and Deng’s policies, Mao again seized control of the party in 1966. He 
returned to the earlier emphasis on ideological egalitarianism and collectivist production (Tsang 
2000), launching the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. During the Cultural Revolution 
period, policies promoting educational equality and ideological purity (“redness”) regained 
priority. Almost all secondary and tertiary educational institutions were closed during the early 
years of this period (secondary schools from 1966 to 1968 and tertiary institutions from 1966 to 
1972). When they reopened, they concentrated on political indoctrination and instituted policies 
and practices designed to narrow the gaps between manual and nonmanual workers, urban and 
rural people, and workers and peasants (Hannum 1999). Politically-oriented admission criteria 
prevailed, often based on class backgrounds, which accomplished the goal of increasing the 
enrollment of worker and peasant children. There was also an ideological emphasis on gender 










Because an essential goal of the Cultural Revolution was to reduce differences between the 
peasantry and the rest of the population (Deng and Treiman 1997), key-point (academic elite) 
schools, multiple tracks, vocational education, and entrance examinations all were abolished. At 
the same time, many new primary and especially secondary schools were opened in villages and 
made affordable, although typically with a low academic standard (Unger 1982). Consequently, 
the fraction of rural children attending middle school increased (Han 2001). Colleges were 
closed to high school graduates yet open to a limited number of students with less education but 
from suitable political and family backgrounds (Zhou et al. 1998). These state interventions 
aimed at explicitly reducing class differences rendered educational attainment during this period 
less dependent on social origins than was the case previously (Deng and Treiman 1997). 
Furthermore, the egalitarian political climate had an equalizing effect on educational disparities 
between men and women (Hannum and Xie 1994). 
 
PERIOD 4: POST-MAO ECONOMIC REFORM (1977 TO 1996)  
 
With the repudiation of the Cultural Revolution after Mao’s death, Deng geared development of 
the educational system to the advancement of economic modernization and reemphasized a 
competitive merit-based educational agenda. The rapid expansion of education during the 
Cultural Revolution was blamed for the low quality of many schools and, as a remedy, schools 
judged to be low-quality were closed. Meanwhile, key-point and vocational schools proliferated. 
Moreover, after 1978 the foundation of education financing was changed from a centralized 
system with a narrow revenue base to a decentralized system with a more diversified revenue 
base (Tsang 1996, 2000; Tsui 1997). This exacerbated funding disparities, particularly between 
rural and urban schools. Decentralization also led to an increase in educational fees, which 
particularly affected children in poor rural areas that were least able to subsidize schools. Finally, 
with the introduction of the Household Responsibility System (HRS) (which allocated collective 
land to individual families, who were allowed to sell their after-tax agricultural surplus on the 
open market), parents were more likely to keep children out of school due to the increasing 
economic value of child labor (Summerfield 1994).  
 
All these factors contributed to an increase in educational inequality and to the curtailment of 
access to education for rural children in particular (Hannum 1999). These factors also 
exacerbated differentials in families’ willingness to invest in their male and female children 
(Summerfield 1994). During the reform period, female participation in schooling declined at all 
education levels and the gender gap increased (Rong and Shi 2001). Although there have been 
efforts to increase schooling (e.g., the 1986 introduction, but still incomplete implementation, of 
compulsory lower secondary school) and to improve the quality of schools (Tsang 2003), the 
overall consequence of the post-Mao reforms was increased inequality in educational 




In summary, political changes over the past half century appear to have altered both access to 
education and the direct cost of education and have thus affected the ability and incentives of 









sibship size on educational attainment across the four periods, as well as differences in the 
effects of place and gender across these periods. We formalize these expectations in the 
following hypotheses.  
 
Hypothesis 1: During the period emphasizing educational egalitarianism (Period 3, the Cultural 
Revolution), the effect of sibship size should be negligible. In contrast, during the periods 
characterized by a competitive agenda and educational inequality (Periods 2 and 4), the larger 
the number of siblings, the lower the level of education that should be attained, net of other 
factors (for Period 1, see Hypothesis 3).  
 
As noted, during the Cultural Revolution both resource constraints on families and educational 
demands on children were greatly reduced relative to the previous and subsequent periods. We 
thus expect that family differences in material and cultural capital were less important during this 
period than in the preceding and following periods characterized by meritocratic policies. Hence, 
the dilution of these resources in families with many children was less consequential. 
 
Hypothesis 2: During competitive periods, the effect of sibship size is especially detrimental for 
the educationally disadvantaged—girls and rural children—whereas during egalitarian periods, 
such disadvantages are greatly reduced. 
 
Hypothesis 2.1: The sibship size effect varies by sex. It is weak for boys in all periods but 
stronger for girls in meritocratic periods. 
 
Due to strong male preference norms (Poston 2002), families attempt to secure education for 
their sons even when they experience resource constraints. We thus expect the effect of sibship 
size to be relatively weak for boys in all periods, despite shifting policies. In contrast, because 
educating daughters is generally regarded as less important, girls’ educational opportunities are 
the first to suffer when there are many children or when resources are limited relative to the cost 
of education, as in the meritocratic periods. We thus expect that in such periods the gender gap in 
resource allocation was exacerbated, meaning that sibship size had especially large consequences 
for girls’ schooling. 
 
Hypothesis 2.2: The sibship size effect depends on type of place of residence, but in a complex 
way that varies by period. 
 
The fundamental claim here is the same as in Hypothesis 1. However, competition for schooling 
in rural and urban areas varies across periods in complex ways. In China, the most important 
factor influencing educational attainment is residence (and residence rights) in an urban versus a 
rural area (Wu and Treiman 2004). The rural–urban divide reflects great institutional, social, and 
economic differences, which in turn affect both educational opportunities and resources (Knight 
and Shi 1996). 
 
In the early years of the communist regime, government provision was weak in rural areas, and 
rural families were poorer than urban families. Relative educational costs were thus much higher, 
resulting in a more pronounced level of competition for limited family resources. For this reason, 









however, the government concentrated investment on existing high-quality urban school 
systems. We thus expect a reduced sibship size effect for urban children. 
 
In contrast, during the Cultural Revolution (Period 3) the government gave high priority to 
education for peasant children and opened many schools in rural areas. In addition, admissions 
criteria were revised to favor students with peasant backgrounds (jiating chushen). Under this 
egalitarian ideology, rural parents were encouraged to educate all their children. We thus expect 
that the sibship size effect was reduced for these children. At the same time, urban children’s 
educational opportunities were restricted. Many urban schools were shut down, and admissions 
criteria were set to discriminate against or completely exclude children from urban backgrounds. 
Many urban students were “sent down” to the countryside to work as peasants (Bernstein 1977; 
Unger 1982). The state policies that promoted rural education at the expense of urban education 
led to a larger sibship size effect for urban children than in the preceding period. 
 
Hypothesis 2.3 describes our expectations regarding Period 4:  
 
 
Hypothesis 2.3: During the economic reform period, state policies such as the introduction of 
fertility control policies and the Household Responsibility System (HRS) also modified the 
sibship size effect: fertility control policies led to an increase in the negative effect of sibship 
size, especially in urban areas, while the HRS produced a positive sibship size effect. We thus 
expect a negative effect in urban areas but, due to the offsetting impacts of several factors, little 
net effect in rural areas. 
 
Birth control policies were implemented in China from the 1970s on. As a result, the number of 
large families decreased, especially in urban areas. Moreover, families with few children were 
subsidized, and families with many children were fined, exacerbating disparities in educational 
resources. For this reason, we expect that the sibship size effect increased during the reform 
period, especially for urban children.  
 
In rural areas, fertility controls were not strongly enforced during this period and thus probably 
had little impact. However, the decentralization of educational financing, noted earlier, strongly 
affected rural areas, resulting in increased school fees, which would be expected to increase the 
sibsize effect. This effect was offset, though, by the introduction of the HRS. Although this 
system sometimes resulted in the removal of children from school to contribute to family 
enterprises, we conjecture that when a family had several children, the optimal strategy was to 
diversify risk by putting some children to work while keeping others in school to gain enough 
education to obtain secure nonagricultural jobs. This suggests the possibility of two offsetting 
mechanisms in the reform period: an increase in the direct costs of education, which should 
increase sibship size effects, and an increased likelihood that parents with several children will 
keep at least some in school, which should reduce sibship size effects.  
 
Hypothesis 3: At extremely low levels of economic development (the precommunist period), 










When educational opportunities are extremely limited, sibship size matters little because almost 
no one attains much education (Hermalin, Seltzer, and Lin 1982; Lloyd 1994; Mueller 1984; 
Sudha 1997). Before 1950, China was at an early stage of socioeconomic development. 
Educational opportunities and facilities were extremely limited. Because most jobs demanded 
muscle power rather than human capital, education was not particularly valued. Parents thus had 
little incentive to invest in their children’s education, which meant that resource dilution was not 
an issue. 
 
A CAVEAT ON METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES  
 
Before turning to the analysis, we need to consider two potential methodological difficulties: the 
possibility that we have the causal order between sibship size and education wrong, and the 
possibility that the observed sibship size effect is spurious because it reflects other aspects of 
family composition, in particular, birth order effects. 
 
ENDOGENOUS QUALITY–QUANTITY TRADEOFF 
 
First, we consider the causal order, or endogeneity, problem. The relationship between sibship 
size and educational outcomes may arise in part from the fact that parents base their fertility 
decisions on calculations as to how many children they can afford given their educational 
aspirations for their children (often referred to as the quality–quantity tradeoff; Steelman et al. 
2002). In this case, the observed effect of sibship size will be exaggerated relative to the true 
causal connection. The question is whether such reverse causality is important or only a minor 
problem. 
 
We find the claim that endogeneity is a major and universal problem unpersuasive. Several 
studies adjust for potential endogeneity by using exogenous fertility events such as twin births 
and sibling sex composition, adopting an instrumental variable approach. Some find little or no 
effect of sibship size (Black, Devereux, and Salvanes 2005a; Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1980), 
while others find the effect to be real (Conley and Glauber 2006; Lu 2005; Maralani 2004). Guo 
and VanWey (1999) perform a longitudinal analysis via change models to test the possibility that 
the sibship size effect results from unmeasured factors correlated with both family size and 
intellectual development and find no sibship size effect on test scores. Although their analysis is 
very thoughtful, it turns on the selection of a small, distinctive subsample and thus cannot easily 
be generalized (for critiques of their study, see Downey et al. [1999], Philips [1999], and 
Steelman et al. [2002]). Using similar models, Baydar, Hyle, and Brooks-Gunn (1997) find that 
family size does have a deleterious effect on aspects of the family environment that shape 
intellectual development. Finally, Steelman and colleagues (2002) suggest the possibility that 
sibship size matters more for educational attainment, which requires material resources, than for 
intellectual performance. 
 
Still, it would be desirable to assess the seriousness of endogeneity for our analysis had we the 
data to do so. Unfortunately, we do not. An over-time fixed-effects analysis is not possible 
because we have only a single cross-section. This leaves the possibility of an instrumental 
variables approach. Despite our best efforts, this approach proved to be unsuccessful due to the 









as an instrument for sibset size in the next period. Even under the best circumstances, this would 
be a “noisy” instrument because our sibset size variable is the number of siblings when the 
respondent was age 14 and hence is contaminated by temporal variations in child mortality rates. 
Still, we tried to identify variations in fertility policy regimes and constructed an instrumental 
variable differentiating periods that emphasized fertility control, encouraged fertility, and 
promoted neither. Because this instrument is not measured at the individual level, it has little 
variability and cannot reflect the differential behavior of parents exposed to the same policy 
regime. Not surprisingly, a formal statistical test shows that it is a weak instrument. 
 
Considerable evidence suggests that such tradeoffs are not a major problem for our analysis. 
Two recent studies address this issue in developing nations using individual-level instruments 
(Lu [2005] on South Africa; Maralani [2004] on Indonesia) and find relatively robust effects of 
sibship size on education. As these authors suggest, the quality–quantity tradeoff is not a major 
issue in populations with a traditional view of childbearing, although it may be important in 
populations that have adopted a developed-Western-nation view of childbearing. Because 
children have long been valued in China as a source of labor and a resource for old age support, 
we think that quality–quantity calculations were relatively uncommon in Chinese families until 
the very recent emergence of an urban middle class. Only the youngest urban cohort is thus 
plausibly subject to a modern “Western” view of childbearing. As we will see, this possibility 
hardly accounts for our overall pattern of findings. 
 
Finally, we can point to two kinds of evidence inconsistent with the claim that fertility is strongly 
responsive to the policy changes that, we argue, mediate the effect of sibset size. First, if a 
sibship size effect was present in competitive periods because of endogenous tradeoffs, we 
would expect lower fertility rates in these periods relative to egalitarian periods. To assess this 
possibility, we computed the mean number of siblings for each of the four birth cohorts. We 
shifted the cutting points eight years toward the beginning of the century to capture the years in 
which the respondents were conceived. We found no evidence that women reduced their fertility 
in competitive periods. The means for the four periods are, respectively, 3.0, 3.6, 3.6, and 2.8. 
Second, one could argue that highly educated women are most prone to quality–quantity 
tradeoffs. That is, because such women are more committed to producing “high quality” children 
and more sensitive to what this entails than are women with less education, they should be 
particularly likely to reduce their fertility during competitive periods, making the negative effect 
of mother’s education on fertility particularly large. To test this claim, we need to control for 
differences in family resources because well-educated women are also likely to be materially 
better off, which tends to offset the negative effect of a mother’s education. Since we have no 
measure for level of living during childhood, we used father’s education and father’s 
occupational status as proxies and predicted, via OLS, the number of siblings as a function of 
mother’s education, father’s education, and father’s occupational status. There is no significant 
effect of mother’s education during the first two periods, but there is a negative effect during the 
last two periods: the coefficients for mother’s education in the four periods are, respectively, –
.024, –.021, –.093, and –.089. This pattern, too, is inconsistent with the quality–quantity trade-
off hypothesis. In summary, as best we can tell given the limitations of our data, there is no 
evidence that sibship size is endogenous to educational attainment.  
 










While most studies of sibship size effects focus on between-family inequalities and assume that 
resources are evenly allocated within families, some studies stress within-family inequalities by 
examining the effects of birth order and gender composition. Most of these studies find these 
factors have very little or no effect net of sibship size (Hauser and Sewell 1985; Kessler 1991; 
Kuo and Hauser 1997; Steelman and Powell 1985; Steelman et al. 2002). Observed effects of 
such measures may thus largely reflect their association with sibship size: although an early 
place in the birth order may be advantageous, this may simply reflect the fact that, as a 
mathematical necessity, low-birth-order children disproportionately come from small families.  
 
A few studies make the opposite claim—that observed effects of sibship size are spurious 
artifacts of the association between sibship size and birth order (Black et al. 2005a). A potential 
problem for studies of this kind is the multicolinearity between birth order and sibship size that 
results from including both measures in a single model (correlations of .7 are not uncommon). If 
both measures are influential, however, omitting one causes the model to be underspecified. 
 
An alternative way to study the effects of both factors is to decompose the sibship size effect into 
birth order, birth spacing, and sex composition effects (Chu, Yu, and Tsay 2004; Post and Pong 
1998). A recent study in South Africa (Lu 2005) using such decompositions finds that the 
inclusion of birth order components hardly alters the sibship size effect, and birth order itself has 
no clear influence on schooling. 
 
Unfortunately, our data do not permit such strategies because we have no information on birth 
order. This is not a major limitation because most of the evidence shows that sibship size effects 
are much more robust than other sibling configuration effects (Powell et al. 2004). Moreover, 
sibship size effects, which reflect between-family inequalities in educational chances, are much 
more sensitive to policy changes than are other sibling configuration effects, which reveal 
within-family inequalities. Since the focus of our analysis is the impact of policy on educational 
opportunities, we do not regard our inability to study, or to control for, sibling configurations as 
particularly troublesome. 
 
DATA, VARIABLES, AND METHODS 
 
DATA AND METHODS  
 
We use data from the survey Life Histories and Social Change in Contemporary China (Treiman 
and Walder 1996), a multistage stratified national probability sample of 6,090 adults ages 20 to 
69 (Treiman 1998). Because the urban and rural populations were sampled at different rates, and 
because the survey selected one adult from each household, it is necessary to weight the data to 
permit generalization to the adult population of China. Also, because the data are from a 
multistage stratified sample, we use survey estimation procedures to obtain correct standard 
errors (StataCorp 2007).  
 
The survey gathered extensive information on respondents’ life histories, especially family 
socioeconomic backgrounds. This is a high-quality survey with little missing data. After 









cases with missing responses on any of the other variables considered here, the analysis is based 
on 6,059 cases. Our basic strategy is to estimate a series of OLS regression models predicting 
years of schooling from the number of siblings plus control variables. To highlight the impact of 
political shifts and to account for persistent rural–urban and gender differences, we estimate 
separate models for cohorts corresponding to each of the four periods and, within each period, 




The dependent variable is the years of completed schooling, ranging from 0 to 18.4 A potential 
problem with this specification of educational attainment is that some respondents could still be 
in school. However, this was the case for less than 1 percent of the sample. A more serious 
problem is that about 16 percent of our sample never attended school, and an additional 20 
percent left school before age 14. For these respondents, the number of siblings at age 14 (see 
below) clearly is an imperfect measure of the level of “resource dilution” when their families 
were making schooling decisions. There is no help for this because we have no other measure of 
sibship size. Given the relatively close spacing of children, though, we think our measure is a 
reasonably good proxy for the number of children present when educational decisions were 
made. We also believe our design is superior to those that predict current school enrollment from 
the current number of children in a household (e.g., Anh et al. 1998; Patrinos and 
Psacharopoulos 2004). 
 
Our strategy has several additional advantages. Completed education is of essential interest in 
educational stratification research. Measures such as children’s current educational status may 
obscure differences between leaving school permanently and short-term interruptions or delays 
in schooling for reasons that may not affect an individual’s ultimate attainment. Additionally, 
completed education is the preferred variable for examining the role of state policies—we care 
about the impact of policy on completed education. 
 
The key independent variable is sibship size. We use the total number of siblings at age 14 as an 
indicator, ranging from 0 to 14. We truncate it at seven to reduce the leverage of the small 
number of respondents with a very large sibsize (less than 1 percent of our sample reports eight 
or more siblings). The sibship size variable is treated as both continuous and discrete in the 
analysis.  
 
We code gender as a dichotomous variable. To determine gender differences in the sibship size 
effect, it would be optimal to have information on the gender configuration of a respondent’s 
siblings. For example, girls with many brothers may fare worse than girls with many sisters 
because of norms and family strategies favoring sons over daughters. Because we do not have 
such information, all we can do is estimate effects of sibship size separately for girls and boys. 
 
Urban (versus rural) residential status is defined by formal registration status at age 14. Since 
1955, China has had an internal registration (hukou) system, in which each person is assigned to 
either agricultural or nonagricultural status, with very different rights and privileges (Chan 1994; 
Wang, Zuo, and Ruan 2002; Wu and Treiman 2004). Registration status is better than actual 









were not permitted to attend urban schools. About 20 percent of the sample reached age 14 
before the hukou system was established. These people are coded as rural or urban on the basis 
of their actual residence at age 14.  
 
We also control for parental education, which is known to be an important determinant of both 
family size (Axinn and Barber 2001; Cleland and Rodriguez 1988) and offspring’s education 
(Ganzeboom and Treiman 1993; Shavit and Blossfeld 1993; Treiman and Yip 1989), although 
some recent studies suggest weak or nonexistent effects after controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity (Behrman and Rosenzweig 2002; Black et al. 2005b). We define parental 
education as the years of school completed by the parent who achieved the most schooling. For 
the handful of cases that had information available for only one parent, we used that information.  
 
For the same reasons, we include father’s occupational status (ISEI)5 when a respondent was age 
14 as another aspect of family socioeconomic background. This information is missing from over 
10 percent of the data (N = 731). It is not missing at random; rather, poorly educated people are 
less likely to know about their parental characteristics. We thus include a dichotomous variable, 
scored 1 if father’s occupation was missing and 0 otherwise, and assign the mean ISEI score to 
all cases with missing information. We are not able to control for family income or wealth when 
a respondent was age 14 due to the lack of such information. Parental education and occupational 
status, however, taken together, serve as a partial control for family economic status. 
 
We divide the sample into four cohorts corresponding to the four periods defined earlier. 
Studying the effect of historical events on educational attainment using cross-sectional data is 
difficult because it is unclear where in the educational process the impact is greatest, and an 
individual’s educational process may overlap different historical events. In the present study, we 
use age 7—the modal school entry age in contemporary China (Li and Luo 2004)—as the age at 
which an individual’s education tends to be most affected. Parental decisions affecting children’s 
educational outcomes may depend most powerfully on policies in place during their children’s 
earliest school years because some decisions, once made, cannot be undone. Also, because a 
parent’s influence tends to decline over successive schooling decisions due to individual 
selectivity (Mare 1981), policies affecting early selection are likely to have the greatest impact. 
In addition, primary education was far from universal in China (Tsang 2000). In our data, the 
percentages of children who never attended school for the four cohorts are, respectively, 42, 21, 
8, and 6.6 Because of the substantial variation in early educational attainment, including whether 
children ever attended school at all, state policies probably had a substantial impact even (or 
especially) at this level. 
 
We define the four cohorts on the basis of the year respondents turned 7 years old: the 
precommunist cohort includes those who turned age 7 before or during 1949; the early 
communist-era cohort includes those who turned age 7 between 1950 and 1965; the Cultural 
Revolution cohort includes those who turned age 7 between 1966 and 1976; and the economic 
reform cohort includes those who turned age 7 between 1977 and 1983. Because our choice of 
dividing points is necessarily somewhat arbitrary, we conducted sensitivity tests by comparing 
results obtained from different choices of cutting points. Our results are robust to alternative 












DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
 
Appendix Tables A1 and A2 present descriptive statistics for each cohort as a whole, for cohorts 
subdivided by residential status, and for cohorts subdivided by gender. The general trends are as 
expected. We see that the average sibset size declined from almost five children (the number of 
siblings plus one) in the second cohort to about 3.7 children in the fourth cohort. The decline is 
particularly sharp for the most recent cohort influenced by the birth control policies.7 The 
relatively high fertility even for the youngest cohort reflects the fact that the one-child policy was 
not implemented until after 1976, the birth year of our youngest respondents. Meanwhile, the 
average years of schooling increased from 3.9 before the transition to communism to 8.2 during 
the economic reform period. 
 
The results largely reflect changes in governmental educational policies. During the 
precommunist period, the average level of education was very low, with a relatively large 
dispersion around the mean. After Liberation, the mean years of schooling increased while 
dispersion decreased. Notably, the greatest change was between the second and third periods, as 
would be expected given the competitive policies implemented during the second period and the 
great emphasis on equality during the Cultural Revolution period. Educational outcomes in the 
economic reform period are not very different from those in the third period, presumably because 
of offsetting trends: a renewed competitive agenda but also increased opportunity costs 
associated with the Household Responsibility System.  
 
Table A1 also shows rural–urban disparities period-by-period. The first two periods show 
essentially no urban–rural difference in the average number of siblings, but the last two periods 
show a substantial reduction in sibset size for the urban-origin population. Rural–urban 
differences in educational attainment were strong and consistent across cohorts. The average 
level of schooling increased monotonically period-by-period in urban areas but remained the 
same between the third and fourth periods in rural areas. Consistent with the competitive thrust 
of the second period and the egalitarian thrust of the third period, the average years of schooling 
increased somewhat more substantially for those of rural origin than for those of urban origin.  
 
Several gender comparisons in Table A1 are of interest. First, policy effects are difficult to 
discern because they are swamped by the secular trend toward increasing educational equality 
between males and females. Although males achieved more education in every period, the 
gender gap systematically declined over time. Second, for males, the level of education declined 
in the fourth cohort compared with the third. This, too, probably reflects the increased 
opportunity costs of education during the reform period. Third, in all four periods the number of 
siblings is slightly greater for females, which is consistent with the claim that when Chinese 
parents have daughters, they sometimes try again for a son. 
 
As Table A2 shows, even the most recent cohort has substantial variability in family size. 
Clearly, the fertility control policies implemented in the 1970s had little impact on this cohort, 









important because it makes clear that our results likely are not driven by the extreme behavior of 
a small number of large families. 
 
OVERALL EFFECT  
We first regress years of schooling on sibship size alone. It turns out that the gross cost of each 
additional sibling in China is about one-fifth of a year of education (β  = –.18). We observe a 
significant but smaller cost (β = –.08; p = .023) even when controlling for other background 
variables. We have claimed that the cost of additional siblings is due to the dilution of resources. 
We are able to make one explicit test, following Downey (1995), by studying the impact of sibset 
size on the availability of a particular resource: whether respondents had their own study desks at 
age 14 (via logistic regression and adjusting for other control variables). The logit associated 
with sibship size (β = –.110; p = .004) indicates that each additional sibling reduced the odds 
that a respondent had a study desk by about 10 percent. We suspect that the availability of other 
resources, both material and intellectual, would be similarly affected by sibsize, but we are 
unable to make any additional tests. 
 
Next, we extend the overall model by including: (1) interactions between the period dummies 
and each of the other independent variables; (2) three-way interactions between the period 
dummies, gender, and each of the other variables; and (3) three-way interactions between the 
period dummies, registration status, and each of the other variables.8 All three models fit 
significantly better than the overall model (p < .001), and in each model, all the interactions 
involving sibship size are at least marginally significant.9 We conclude that the effect of sibship 
size varies by period, residential status, and gender, as expected from our theoretical discussion. 
We therefore estimate separate models in the remainder of the article. 
 
 
SIBSHIP SIZE EFFECTS BY PERIOD 
 
Table 1 provides evidence consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 3.10 In the second and fourth 
periods, there are substantial negative effects of sibship size, with each additional sibling costing 
nearly a fifth of a year of schooling, an effect comparable in size to that observed in developed 
nations. By contrast, there is no effect of sibship size in the first or third periods. Formal 
statistical tests confirm that the observed differences in the effects of sibship size are significant 
(p < .000 for the contrast of Periods 1 and 3 versus Periods 2 and 4, and p < .002 for the contrast 




We also estimated parallel models treating sibship size as a set of discrete variables. The results 
are consistent with those from the continuous specification and thus are not shown here: in the 
second and fourth periods, the coefficients are increasingly negative in a nearly monotonic way, 
whereas in the other two periods, the coefficients show no clear pattern. 
 










To test Hypotheses 2.2 and 2.3, we estimate separate models within each period for individuals 
with rural and urban registration at age 14 (Table 2). Our results show the complex interaction 




In the first period, we expected no differences in sibship size effects (Hypothesis 3). No urban–
rural difference should thus exist, and none was found (p < .983). In the second period, sharp 
urban–rural differences exist: as expected, sibship size hardly mattered for those from urban 
origins, while it was detrimental for those from rural origins (p < .06). In the third (Cultural 
Revolution) period, the rural–urban differential effect is reversed, again as expected. No sibship 
size effect exists for rural children, but there is a substantial negative effect (–.16) for urban 
children. This contrast, though, is not statistically significant. 
 
The results for the fourth (economic reform) period are consistent with Hypothesis 2.3. As 
described earlier, this period is characterized by competitive policies, which should lead to a 
strong sibship size effect. Indeed, we observe just that in urban areas: the cost of each additional 
child is about a half year of schooling, a very strong effect. The large effect may result in part 
from intensified birth control policies, particularly in urban areas (Croll, Davin, and Kane 1985; 
Hsu 1985). As fertility declined, the remaining large families in urban areas may have become 
increasingly disadvantaged due to policies that encouraged low fertility by compensating small 
families and penalizing large families. The unusually large effect also may reflect, in part, 
endogenous quality–quantity calculations made by parents. Given the very large size of the 
effect, though, it is unlikely that endogenous tradeoffs are entirely responsible. 
 
In rural areas, the sibship size effect, although negative, is small and not statistically significant. 
This is as expected. Earlier, we hypothesized that in rural areas, the reduction in educational 
opportunities due to fiscal decentralization and increased competition may have been offset by 
the introduction of the Household Responsibility System, which increased the opportunity costs 
of children’s education for small rural families. For families engaged in agriculture or a family 
business, sibship size could actually have had a positive effect on children’s education. A partial 
test of this claim is possible by modeling educational attainment separately for those from rural 
origins whose fathers were engaged in agriculture or small businesses when the respondent was 
age 14 and those whose fathers had other occupations. As shown in Table 3, for those whose 
fathers were not engaged in agriculture or small businesses, there is a substantial negative effect 
of sibship size (although the effect is only marginally significant due to the small sample size). 
By contrast, among those whose families were engaged in family enterprises, the sibship size 




An explicit test confirms our hypothesized contrast for the rural population of Periods 2 and 4 
(competitive) versus Periods 1 and 3 (egalitarian) (p < .000). Such a test is not appropriate for the 
urban population because we hypothesized a more complex pattern of variation across periods. 
 










Table 4 shows results pertinent to Hypothesis 2.1. As expected, there is no sibship size effect for 
males in any period, but for females there is a strong negative effect of sibship size in the two 
periods characterized by a competitive educational agenda. The sharp gender contrast is 
consistent with our claim that during periods in which educational competition is strong, girls 
suffer when family resources are diluted by the presence of many children. The absence of a 
sibship size effect for males even during competitive periods is consistent with the claim that 




Our hypothesized contrasts between periods are confirmed by explicit tests: as expected, there is 
no significant difference for males between competitive periods (2 and 4) and egalitarian periods 
(1 and 3) in the size of the sibship size effect (p < .274). For females, though, the same contrast is 
highly significant (p < .000). Differences between males and females are significant in Period 2 
(p < .001) but not significant in Periods 1 and 3, all as expected. There is, however, one 
inconsistent result: in Period 4, the gender difference is not significant (p < .257) even though the 
coefficient for females is more than twice that for males. This may reflect the relatively small 
number of respondents in this period. 
 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
 
Because of its distinctive history, China presents an unusual opportunity for students of social 
stratification to explore the impact of government institutions in shaping the educational 
stratification process. In contrast to developed nations, where the detrimental effect of additional 
siblings appears to be universal, sibship size effects have varied over time in China in response 
to vicissitudes in state policy, which alternately promoted educational equality and educational 
competition. These policies played out in complex ways, affecting males and females and those 
from urban and rural origins in different ways at different times.  
 
Although somewhat complex in their detail, the results presented here can be summarized quite 
simply: when schooling opportunities were limited and expensive, children in large families, 
especially girls, obtained less schooling; when schooling expanded and became relatively less 
expensive, the detrimental effect of having many siblings disappeared. When competition for 
schooling is pronounced, family resources—both material and cognitive—become more 
important, and a larger sibsize results in the dilution of resources available to any given child. 
 
Because of data limitations, our empirical analysis for the most part does not involve direct tests 
of the presence of resources within families nor of the degree of educational competition. 
Instead, it proceeds indirectly through comparisons of sibship size effects across four historical 
periods (precommunist, early communist, Cultural Revolution, and economic reform) and 
comparisons of effects for males and females and for those from urban and rural origins within 
each period. We argue that the four periods were characterized by quite different educational 










We find that sibship size had little impact on the education of males in any period due to strong 
son preferences, which prevail even today in China. During competitive periods, however, large 
sibship sizes tended to exacerbate the disadvantages already faced by girls. When the state 
enforced an egalitarian agenda during the Cultural Revolution, though, the disadvantage for girls 
with many siblings disappeared. 
 
Rural–urban differences in the sibship size effect are more complex. During the precommunist 
period, sibship size mattered little for anyone because of the extreme limitation in educational 
opportunities. In the early communist period, when the urban educational system expanded but 
rural areas were subject to harsh conditions, sibship size had little impact on urban children, 
while it had a large influence on rural children. During the Cultural Revolution, however, the 
impact was reversed, with a pronounced sibship size effect in urban areas but not in rural areas.  
 
The economic reform period is particularly complex, with several offsetting pressures. In urban 
areas, fertility control policies that subsidized families with few children and fined families with 
many children exacerbated disparities in educational resources between small and large families. 
The result was an unusually large negative sibship size effect. In rural areas, however, the 
fertility control policies were not enforced very strongly. Moreover, the effect of increased 
educational competition was offset by the Household Responsibility System (HRS), which 
created opportunity costs for families with few children because children were needed to help in 
the fields. As a result, we observe small and statistically nonsignificant sibship size effects for 
children of rural origins. 
 
Due to the lack of suitable data, we cannot control for the possibility of endogeneity—that 
parents decide to limit fertility to maximize children’s education. Our analysis suggests, 
however, that endogeneity is not likely to seriously contaminate our results. Endogenous quality–
quantity calculations must have been relatively uncommon in China until the fourth period given 
the high fertility levels. State policy during the early communist period was strongly pro-natalist 
due to Mao’s advocacy of “mass production,” which greatly enhanced the value of and the need 
for labor, and thus the value of and the demand for children. This campaign was especially 
strong during the Great Leap Forward Period from 1958 to 1960 (Peng 1987). As Appendix 
Table A2 shows, fertility was quite high during this period. Although it is possible that some 
families made endogenous fertility decisions, it must have been uncommon given the extremely 
strong ideological fever commonly observed in many social arenas during this period. In the 
Cultural Revolution period, endogenous quality–quantity tradeoffs are beside the point because 
we observe no sibship size effect. This leaves the economic reform period, in which endogenous 
quality–quantity tradeoffs could help to account for the extremely high sibship size effect in the 
urban population. For the rural population, by contrast, the HRS created an incentive for parents 
to have more children to have more hands in the fields. We have suggested that families with 
many children kept some of them in school as a risk diversification strategy. None of this is 
consistent, however, with a decision to limit fertility to promote educational chances. 
 
We conclude that in China, individual life chances under state socialism are extremely sensitive 
to political processes. By explicitly taking into account state policies, this research contributes to 
our understanding of the mediating role of government policies in altering opportunity structures 









family—specifically, policies that affect the availability and cost of schooling—affect internal 
family dynamics, exacerbating or minimizing the role of sibship size as a determinant of 
educational outcomes. 
 
The evidence presented in this article suggests that governmental equalizing policies have the 
potential to eliminate the educational disadvantages faced by children with many siblings, 
particularly rural children and girls, ultimately reducing educational, gender, and place 
stratification. Our study, focusing on variations over time within a society, reaches conclusions 
similar to those of two cross-national studies that show the mediating role of welfare policies 
(Park 2005; Xu 2003). Our findings should hearten educational policymakers because promoting 
equalizing policies is far more tractable than eliminating poverty. For comparativists, these 
results suggest that government policies in developing societies can play crucial roles in altering 
educational resources available to individual children and in allocating these resources equally 
for boys and girls and for rural and urban children. We hope our work inspires similar studies of 
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Table 1. Coefficients from OLS Regressions of Years of Schooling on Sibship Size and Control 
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R2 .275 .253 .214 .312 
Unweighted N 1,260 2,240 1,766 793 































Table 2. Coefficients from OLS Regressions of Years of Schooling on Sibship Size and Control 

























































































































R2 .200 .206 .149 .169 .157 .124 .228 .156 
Unweighted 
N 
388 872     
618 
1,622    488  1,278    236    557 










Table 3. Coefficients from OLS Regressions of Years of Schooling on Sibship Size and Control 
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R2 .107 .114 
Unweighted N 441 110 







































Table 4. Coefficients of OLS Regressions of Years of Schooling on Sibship Size and Control 


























































































































R2 .176 .280 .151 .235 .159 .205 .308 .316 
Unweighted N 665 595 1,156 1,084 855 911 399 394 
Notes: ISEI = International Socioeconomic Index of Occupations. Standard errors are in 










1 We use Hannum and Xie’s (1994) “egalitarian” and “competitive” terminology to distinguish 
the two competing policies. Although any dichotomization of historical periods will necessarily 
be something of a simplification, we think this dichotomy captures an important policy contrast 
central to our analysis.  
  
2 We conducted exploratory analyses in which we divided the 1950 to 1965 years into two 
periods: 1950 to 1957 and 1958 to 1965. The results for the two periods were substantially 
similar. Thus, in the interest of parsimony and to increase the sample size, we analyze four rather 
than five periods. 
  
3 Father’s occupation is the only variable in the analysis that has missing data for more than a 
handful of cases. 
  
4 Our measure of years of schooling in the data is a simple transformation of a respondent’s 
highest educational level.  
  
5 Father’s occupational status is measured by the International Socioeconomic Index of 
Occupations (ISEI) (Ganzeboom, De Graaf, and Treiman 1992). This scale behaves in a manner 
similar to the well-known Duncan (1961) SEI. 
  
6 Even for the fourth cohort, primary school education was not required. This cohort typically 
began school between 1977 and 1983, but the Compulsory Education Law was not implemented 
until 1986. 
  
7 The somewhat lower average sibset size for the first cohort compared with that for the second 
cohort probably reflects a combination of differential mortality by SES and the disruption of the 
war years. Those from large sibsets were likely to be of low SES (Lavely and Freedman 1990; 
Zhang 1990) and hence were disproportionately likely to have died prior to the survey date 
(Banister and Hill 2004; Zimmer and Kwong 2004).  Also, infant mortality was particularly high 
during the war years (Banister 1987; Peng and Guo 2000). We conducted sensitivity analyses to 
assess the impact of differential mortality on the sibship size effect for the first cohort. We tried 
both random sampling from respondents in this cohort and oversampling respondents with a high 
SES background (whose parents received at least some middle school education). These analyses 
yield very similar conclusions to those we report.  
  
8 Sample size limitations preclude testing four-way interactions. 
 
9 For the three models, the p-values from adjusted Wald tests were, respectively, .12, .05, and 
.03. 
  
10 Table 1 also shows other changes in factors affecting educational attainment that are not 
directly pertinent to our analysis. First, consistent with Deng and Treiman’s (1997) claim that the 
Cultural Revolution greatly undercut the effect of family socioeconomic status on educational 
attainment, the effects of parental education and father’s ISEI are smallest for the Cultural 
































































Table A1. Means and Percentages by Period, Rural versus Urban Residential Status, and Gender; 
Chinese Adults 1996 (N = 6,059) 
 















Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Respondent’s Schooling           
Total 3.9 4.2 5.9 4.0 8.0 3.6 8.2 3.3 6.4 4.1 
Urban 6.5 4.7 9.0 3.2 10.5 2.4 11.0 2.3 9.2 3.7 
Rural 3.2 3.8 5.3 3.9 7.4 3.5 7.4 3.1 5.8 4.0 
Males 5.0 4.1 7.0 3.5 8.8 3.2 8.4 3.2 7.2 3.8 
Females 2.5 3.8 4.7 4.1 7.2 3.8 7.9 3.4 5.5 4.3 
Number of Siblings           
Total 3.1 1.8 3.7 1.8 3.6 1.6 2.7 1.6 3.4 1.8 
Urban 3.1 1.9 3.6 1.9 3.0 1.6 2.2 1.3 3.1 1.8 
Rural 3.0 1.8 3.7 1.8 3.7 
 
1.6 2.9 1.6 3.4 1.8 
Males 3.0 1.8       3.6       1.9              3.5 : 1.7 2.5 1.4 3.3 1.8 
Females 3.1 1.8   3.7       1.8              3.7 1.6 2.9 1.7 3.5 1.8 
Parental Schooing 
Total 1.6 2.7 2.3 3.2 4.2 4.0 5.9 4.1 3.2 3.8 
Urban 2.8 3.7 4.5 4.3 7.1 4.5 9.7 3.9 5.7 4.8 
Rural 1.4 2.3 1.8 2.7 3.5 3.6 5.0 3.6 2.7 3.3 
Males 1.6 2.7 2.3 3.3 4.3 4.1 5.8 4.1 3.2 3.8 
Females 1.7 2.7 2.2 3.1 4.0 4.0 6.1 4.1 3.2 3.8 
Father’s ISEI           
Total 23.1 12.0 23.2 13.2 26.8 17.1 26.7 17.0 24.7 14.9 
Urban 31.2 15.8 36.2 17.2 43.1 17.7 47.3 16.8 38.9 17.9 
Rural 21.0 9.9 20.8 10.7 23.1 14.7 21.5 12.6 21.5 12.0 
Males 22.9 11.9 23.0 12.9 27.0 17.3 26.1 16.8 24.5 14.7 
Females 23.3 12.2 23.5 13.6 26.5 17.0 27.4 17.3 24.9 15.1 
Father’s ISEI Missing           
Total 23.0%  12.9  4.9  5.3  11.6  
Urban 24.5%  11.9  6.1  4.3  11.9  
Rural 22.6%  13.1  4.7  5.6  11.6  
Males 23.0%  13.3  4.7  4.7  11.8  
Females 22.9%  12.6  5.2  5.9  11.5  
Male           
Total 55.0%  50.9  50.1  52.0  51.7  
Urban 54.5%  50.8  52.4  51.9  52.2  
Rural 55.2%  50.9  50.0  52.4  51.6  
Urban           
Total 20.2%  15.9  18.3  20.2  18.1  
Male 20.0%  15.9  19.1  20.1  18.3  
Female 20.5%  16.0  17.5  20.3  17.9  
Unweighted N           
Total 1,260  2,240  1,766  793  6,059  
Urban 388  618  488  236  1,730  
Rural 872  1,622  1,278  557  4,329  









Females 595  1,084  911  394  2,984  
 
Note: ISEI = International Socioeconomic Index of Occupations. 
